Apache HTTP Server Vulnerability Poses Risk of Remote Code Execution

A critical vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server’s HTTP/2 module could allow unauthenticated remote code execution. Server owners should check their configuration and upgrade to 2.4.71 or later.

· 4 min read · 5 comments

On November 12, 2026, Wiz reported a critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-119618, in the HTTP/2 module of the Apache HTTP Server web server. Anthropic and the Google Cloud Vulnerability Research Team discovered the bug independently. An unauthenticated remote attacker could execute code on the server. Server owners should check their Apache version and whether HTTP/2 is in use, then upgrade to 2.4.71 or later if necessary. At the time of publication, Wiz said there was no publicly available exploit and no reports of attacks.

How the bug occurs and which versions are affected

The issue lies in the assign_headers() function of the mod_http2 module. A synchronization error occurs when threads work concurrently with shared resources. It can lead to heap memory corruption and, ultimately, execution of arbitrary commands with the privileges of the web server process. The attack path described involves HTTP/2 features.

Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.55 through 2.4.70, inclusive, are listed as affected. A fix is available in version 2.4.71 and later. So seeing the product name on a list of server software is not enough: you need to find out which version is running in the specific deployment and whether HTTP/2 is enabled.

The publication contains an inconsistency concerning the separately built mod_h2 module. Its table lists versions 2.0.8–2.0.42 as affected, while also listing versions starting with 2.0.24 as fixed. Those ranges overlap. In its recommendations below, Wiz advises upgrading a standalone build to a version later than 2.0.42. If you use this module, you cannot rely on the table’s fixed-version column alone.

What site owners and development teams should check

The first step for anyone managing a server is to identify the installed Apache HTTP Server version and check the protocol settings. If the version is between 2.4.55 and 2.4.70 and HTTP/2 is in use, upgrading to 2.4.71 or later is recommended. For standalone mod_h2 builds, the publication recommends a version later than 2.0.42. Checking the configuration matters: the version number alone does not show whether the functionality associated with the vulnerability is in use.

If an upgrade is not yet possible, the proposed temporary measure is to disable HTTP/2 support and leave only HTTP/1.1 enabled. To do that, remove h2 and h2c from the list of allowed protocols in the configuration, leaving Protocols http/1.1. This removes the attack path described, but does not replace installing the fix. Before changing the settings, the team needs to understand which configuration is active on the server and how the sites running on it depend on that configuration.

For a business, the potential damage goes beyond a site becoming unavailable: the outcome described is command execution with the privileges of the web server process. In the cloud, a compromised Apache instance in a container or virtual machine could become an entry point for moving to neighboring microservices or cloud metadata. That is a possible scenario, not a report of observed attacks.

According to Wiz, 64% of cloud environments have resources vulnerable to CVE-2026-119618, and 51% have publicly accessible instances. The assessment did not account for configuration. These figures therefore cannot be interpreted as the proportion of servers on which an attack would necessarily succeed. A site owner would be better served by asking their administrator to check the version, protocol settings, and upgrade plan than by applying cloud-wide statistics to their own server.

This situation is a reminder that vulnerability reports require a look not just at the technology named, but also at the conditions needed for an attack. We have previously covered the HTTP2Shell vulnerability in Brotli on the blog; this is a different issue involving thread synchronization in an Apache module.

My view: check the configuration before assessing the risk

I would not equate “the version falls within the affected range” with “the site can be attacked right now.” But the lack of a publicly available exploit at the time of publication is no reason to put off checking, either. I want specific answers: where is an affected version running, is HTTP/2 enabled, who is responsible for upgrading the server, and what will happen if the protocol has to be disabled before the upgrade?

The conflicting version information for standalone mod_h2 is another reason to double-check the plan. I would not declare a build fixed based on one row of a table when the recommendations in the same publication give a different cutoff. For systems that handle orders and integrations, the decision to upgrade or temporarily disable the protocol is best made after checking the actual configuration and what happens if the protocol is disabled.

Sources

Where the news comes from. The text is a retelling in the author’s own words; the facts come from the source, the opinion is the author’s.

  1. Critical RCE Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server www.wiz.io

About the author

Elia Yefymenko

Lead e-commerce backend developer

I’m responsible for integrations, orders, and the stability of stores with large catalogs. Before making an architecture decision, I ask to see the load and failure scenario—on paper, everything scales.

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  1. I’d push back on treating HTTP/2 being enabled as the main risk signal: the article says the bug is in mod_http2, but exposure also depends on the affected Apache version and how that module is built and loaded. Measure the actual deployment before deciding how urgent the upgrade is, though moving to 2.4.71 or later is the clear fix.

    1. @nils.yakovlev exactly, check the loaded module and deployed version first; HTTP/2 being enabled alone doesn’t tell you whether this build is exposed, and 2.4.71+ is the clean fix

      1. @ilie.negru I ran into a similar check while learning to deploy Apache: the config file suggested HTTP/2 was enabled, but the running container was using a different image than I expected. Since then I verify the deployed version and whether mod_http2 is actually loaded, not just what the config says. For this CVE, I’d still treat upgrading to 2.4.71+ as the straightforward fix once the affected build is confirmed.

        1. @jonas.builds, I’d also check the running container’s image digest or package manifest alongside `httpd -v` and the loaded-module list; a version string from the host can describe a different Apache install than the one serving traffic. That gives you a more reliable basis for deciding whether this build needs the 2.4.71+ upgrade.

    2. @nils.yakovlev one extra wrinkle: a config dump can say HTTP/2 is enabled while a proxy or load balancer terminates it before requests reach Apache, so the relevant check is whether the affected origin actually loads and exposes mod_http2. “We use HTTP/2” is a deployment diagram, not a risk assessment.